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Abstract
Religious belief is a topic of longstanding interest to psychological science, but the psychology of religious disbelief is
a relative newcomer. One prominently discussed model is analytic atheism, wherein cognitive reflection, as measured with
the Cognitive Reflection Test, overrides religious intuitions and instruction. Consistent with this model, performance-based
measures of cognitive reflection predict religious disbelief in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, & Democratic)
samples. However, the generality of analytic atheism remains unknown. Drawing on a large global sample (N = 3461) from 13
religiously, demographically, and culturally diverse societies, we find that analytic atheism as usually assessed is in fact quite
fickle cross-culturally, appearing robustly only in aggregate analyses and in three individual countries. The results provide
additional evidence for culture’s effects on core beliefs.
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1 Introduction
Are analytic thinkers less religious than people who follow
their gut intuitions? Prominent atheists argue that rejec-
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tion of religion primarily arises from their superior analytic
prowess (e.g., Dawkins, 2006). In support of this analytic
atheism conjecture, small but stable correlations between
intelligence — itself associated with analytic thinking and
cognitive reflection — and religious disbelief have been ob-
served (Zuckerman, Silberman & Hall, 2013). Additionally,
atheism is overrepresented amongst elite scientists as com-
pared with non-elite scientists and non-scientists (Larson &
Witham, 1998).
Drawing on dual process theories of human cognition
(Evans, 2003) and work on the putatively intuitive roots of
religious belief (e.g., Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Bloom,
2007; Boyer, 2008), three independent teams published
highly similar findings in 2012, observing that individuals
who perform better on a commonly used behavioral measure
of cognitive reflection, the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT,
Frederick, 2005), tend to report lower levels of religious
belief and have a higher probability of self-identifying as
atheists (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Pennycook, Cheyne,
Seli, Koehler & Fugelsang, 2012; Shenhav, Rand & Greene,
2012). Additionally, two of the teams reported that sub-
tle experimental prods designed to nudge people to think
more analytically also led them to report lower levels of
religious belief (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Shenhav et
al., 2012). These results were taken as strong support for
analytic atheism, and received widespread attention, both
within academia (averaging over 240 citations apiece as of
December 2017, via Google Scholar) and within popular
culture (one article is among the top articles ever scored by
Altmetrics). This pioneering research on analytic atheism
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spawned numerous follow-ups, and a recent meta-analysis
of all 31 known studies (total N > 15000) on the topic found
a stable, albeit small, negative correlation between cognitive
reflection and religious belief (Pennycook, Ross, Koehler &
Fugelsang, 2016).
Despite widespread enthusiasm for analytic atheism, there
are several reasons to be skeptical about the mechanisms
suggested by its proponents. First, there is only one known
successful replication of any of the early experimental work
suggesting that subtle primes for cognitive reflection actually
increase atheism (Yilmaz, Karadöller & Sofuoglu, 2016).
Second, independent investigations have found that other ex-
perimental prods to think analytically do not reliably reduce
religiosity (Yonker, Edman, Cresswell & Barrett, 2016).
Third, one multi-site, preregistered study (Sanchez, Sunder-
meier, Gray & Calin-Jageman, 2017) did not replicate one
of the early experimental studies (Gervais & Norenzayan,
2012, Study 2). Recent work also questions the suppos-
edly intuitive underpinnings of religious cognition (Farias
et al., 2017). More fundamental, however, the clear ma-
jority of work on cognitive style and religious belief has
taken place in North America, either in university settings
or via Mechanical Turk, with rare exceptions (Yilmaz et al.,
2016; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2016). Even if a correlation be-
tween cognitive reflection and religious disbelief turns out
to be supported in North America, the degree to which such
processes generalize widely beyond WEIRD (Western, Ed-
ucated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic: Henrich, Heine &
Norenzayan, 2010) cultural contexts is still largely unknown.
Certain features of religious beliefs vary strongly by culture
(Purzycki et al., 2016), while others appear to be relatively
stable (Gervais et al., 2017). It would be fortuitous and
elegant if a parsimonious explanation of religious disbelief
arising from cognitive reflection were generalizable to all or
most cultures. However, set against a wider empirical back-
ground, the degree to which we can generalize the North
American analytic atheism findings — both the unsettled
experimental work, and the reliable but small correlations
— remains an open question.
A strong version of the analytic atheism thesis is that ana-
lytic cognitive style and cognitive reflection should generally
predict lower belief in gods. This predictive effect should be
both substantial and universal. That is, the strong version
of analytic atheism specifies that analytic thinking and cog-
nitive reflection are primary drivers of atheism worldwide,
implying that the magnitude of effect sizes must be more
than modest. Further, a strong version of analytic atheism
does not easily predict cross-cultural heterogeneity in the
magnitude of the predictive effect of cognitive reflection on
religious disbelief.
Here, we systematically evaluate the association between
cognitive reflection and religious disbelief across 13 reli-
giously, demographically, and culturally diverse societies.
Sampled societies range from highly religious countries such
as India to highly secular countries such as the Nether-
lands and China. Societies also differ in their majority reli-
gious composition, from Buddhist (Singapore), to Christian
(USA), to Hindu (Mauritius), to Muslim (United Arab Emi-
rates), to nonreligious (Czech Republic) traditions, and oth-
ers. This multi-site design allows us to step beyond debates
about mere replicability by additionally assessing the cross-
cultural generalizability of a widely-discussed mechanism
underlying atheism.
2 Method
Participants in all 13 countries completed the CRT, and a
face-valid item of religious belief, rating strength in belief
in God or gods from 0 (definitely does not exist) to 100
(definitely exists). Crucially, both the CRT and the belief in
God(s) item were used in one of the initial studies on cog-
nitive reflection and religion (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012,
Study 1) allowing for direct replication, comparison, and
extension. The countries were convenience sampled1, but
selected to represent a broad range of religious backgrounds.
Most participants were young, and 9 samples were students
(Table 1). Data from 12 countries were obtained from an
existing dataset from a previous unrelated project (Gervais
et al., 2017), while United States data were taken from a
larger university sample, allowing increased estimate preci-
sion. Participants in China and India were directly paid for
their participation; Australia, Czech Republic, Hong Kong,
the Netherlands, NewZealand, Singapore, United Arab Emi-
rates, the United Kingdom, and the USA were student sam-
ples participating either for course credit or to be enrolled in
a lottery. The Indian participants were recruited from Me-
chanical Turk and were screened to include only participants
who reported not having previously done the CRT. Addi-
tional demographic and methodological details are available
in a supplement at https://osf.io/p5h6s/.
We note that the present study was not fully preregistered,
although our initial recruitment and preregistration in the
original project (https://osf.io/f6tcr/) did mention the pos-
sibility of using collected data to run the present analyses
separately. In total, we analyzed data from 3461 participants
(69% female) across 13 countries.2 This number far ex-
ceeds the sample size of most social psychological research
(including research on this topic) and provides an adequate
sample size for good estimate precision on the aggregate
analysis. In addition, our per-country sample sizes were on
par with previous analytic atheism research. Table 1 displays
1They are basically countries where Gervais had contacts.
24051 participants completed at least some of the questions. 384 partic-
ipants were omitted because they failed an attention check. After omitting
these participants, participants who provided responses outside of accept-
able ranges, and participants who did not complete all measures of interest
were omitted; 3461 participants were retained for full analyses.
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Table 1: Brief demographics of samples in 13 countries. CRT scores reflects the number of correct answers provided on
the CRT out of 3 possible; higher scores reflect greater cognitive reflection. Belief in God was rated from 0–100.
Country N Mean Age [SD] Mean CRT [SD] Mean Belief [SD] Source
Australia 143 20.11 [5.34] 1.28 [1.20] 54.82 [38.83] students
China 207 29.82 [5.95] 1.80 [1.04] 28.74 [35.71] community
Czech Republic 187 21.96 [2.09] 1.06 [0.87] 47.23 [39.88] students
Finland 992 28.15 [8.23] 1.76 [1.10] 31.28 [35.32] mixed
Hong Kong 128 21.01 [2.97] 1.37 [1.13] 62.94 [36.20] students
India 224 30.79 [8.38] 1.42 [1.17] 85.69 [25.70] community
Mauritius 161 21.73 [1.33] 1.13 [0.97] 76.46 [39.21] community
Netherlands 212 19.49 [2.14] 1.12 [1.03] 21.23 [29.96] students
New Zealand 160 23.06 [7.98] 1.24 [1.11] 41.48 [39.84] students
Singapore 161 20.83 [1.69] 1.83 [1.01] 69.75 [30.39] students
UAE 145 19.92 [1.57] 0.63 [0.93] 94.24 [19.04] students
UK 150 25.33 [9.60] 1.30 [1.20] 34.26 [36.90] students
USA 591 19.36 [3.07] 0.77 [1.04] 79.55 [32.04] students
descriptive statistics for each country’s data. Data and code
are available at https://osf.io/v53c4/.
3 Results
We conducted a Bayesian hierarchical (multilevel) model (fit
by the R package from McElreath, 2016, version 1.59) that
provides parameter estimates within each country, as well as
an overall estimate that is directly equivalent to performing a
meta-analysis on thewhole dataset (Vuorre, 2017). Bayesian
analyses offer many benefits (Wagenmakers, Morey & Lee,
2016) such as producing intuitive probability statements for
the credibility of different parameter estimates, contingent
on data and model (Kruschke, 2010; McElreath, 2016). We
used non-informative and mildly regularizing priors, pri-
marily deployed to combat model overfitting (McElreath,
2016). In addition, the Bayesian hierarchical framework al-
leviates some concerns of multiple testing, which would be
problematic when performing separate analyses on each of
the 13 countries (Gelman, Hill & Yajima, 2012). Our final
model treated intercepts and slopes of CRT as random across
countries, and included age and gender as fixed covariates.
These were the only variables shared and uniformly coded
across all 13 sites.
The primary inference in Bayesian estimation is the full
posterior distribution of all estimates. The posterior distri-
bution indexes how plausible or credible it is that different
potential parameters could have yielded the observed data.
Figure 1 displays the posterior distributions for unstandard-
ized betas, which represent the predicted change observed
in individual belief in God as performance on the CRT in-
creases by each additional correct answer. When interpreting
posterior distributions, tighter and taller distributions reflect
less estimate uncertainty than do flatter distributions, and
the relative height along the curve indexes relative estimate
credibility. For example, if the top of the curve is twice as
tall as another point, that means that the estimate at the top
of the curve is twice as good of a guess for the underlying
parameter. Figure 1 also displays the posterior probabil-
ity that cognitive reflection predicts nonzero and negative
changes in belief in God. The posterior probability is in
many ways analogous to how many intuitively misinterpret
directional frequentist p-values: as the probability of a given
effect existing (Oakes, 1986). In addition to the posterior dis-
tributions, Table 2 also summarizes the posterior predictions
with the posterior mean as a point estimate and uncertainty
around this estimate reflected by highest posterior density
intervals (HPDI), which index the range in which the 95%
most credible estimates lie. This is similar to how frequen-
tist confidence intervals are often intuitively misinterpreted
(Hoekstra, Morey, Rouder & Wagenmakers, 2014).
As Table 2 illustrates, and consistent with the cross-
cultural psychology of religion, there was substantial het-
erogeneity in average belief in God across sites (random
intercepts). The posterior probabilities in the right of Fig-
ure 1 show relatively strong overall evidence for a CRT-
disbelief link aggregating across all countries, but among
individual countries only Australia, Singapore, and the USA
show unequivocal evidence of a CRT-religious disbelief link.
New Zealand, the Netherlands, and the Czech Republic pro-
duced almost perfectly equivocal evidence of analytic athe-
ism (posterior probabilities of basically .5) and the UK ac-
tually shows moderate evidence of a sign reversal whereby
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Table 2: Full summary of model coefficients. Mean = poste-
rior mean, SD = posterior standard deviation, lower and up-
per refer to the lower and upper bounds of a 95% highest
posterior density interval. ρ refers to the covariance between
model intercepts and βs (betas) across countries. Standard-
ized βs for slopes appear in brackets.
Mean SD lower upper
Intercepts
Total 55.95 6.66 42.66 69.08
Australia 54.70 2.84 49.07 60.19
China 30.71 2.55 25.70 35.69
Czech 47.58 2.51 42.65 52.49
Finland 31.65 1.21 29.28 34.02
Hong Kong 62.23 2.98 56.40 68.09
India 85.92 2.35 81.31 90.49
Mauritius 77.05 2.70 71.72 82.31
Netherlands 21.19 2.38 16.49 25.81
New Zealand 41.69 2.66 36.45 46.89
Singapore 72.43 2.90 66.71 78.11
UAE 91.75 3.17 85.65 98.06
UK 34.65 2.75 29.19 39.98
USA 77.17 1.60 74.03 80.31
Unstandardized βs
Female 3.07 0.60 1.91 4.24
Age −0.10 0.70 −1.45 1.29
Mean SD lower upper
CRT
Total −1.89 [−.05] 1.06 −4.00 [−.12] 0.22 [ .02]
Austr. −4.59 [−.14] 2.00 −8.60 [−.26] −0.94 [−.03]
China −2.44 [−.07] 1.82 −6.11 [−.17] 1.05 [ .03]
Czech 0.58 [ .03] 2.12 −3.33 [−.09] 4.88 [ .15]
Finland −1.18 [−.03] 0.92 −2.99 [−.08] 0.63 [ .02]
H.K. −1.83 [−.05] 1.86 −5.44 [−.16] 1.98 [ .06]
India −2.81 [−.08] 1.59 −5.88 [−.17] 0.37 [ .01]
Maurit. −2.85 [−.08] 1.92 −6.70 [−.19] 0.97 [ .03]
Neth. 0.24 [ .01] 1.79 −3.24 [−.09] 3.81 [ .11]
N.Z. 0.05 [ .01] 1.85 −3.40 [−.09] 3.84 [ .11]
Sing. −5.55 [−.17] 2.24 −10.00 [−.30] −1.41 [−.05]
UAE −3.46 [−.10] 2.09 −7.65 [−.23] 0.66 [ .02]
UK 2.55 [ .09] 2.21 −1.64 [−.03] 6.86 [ .21]
USA −3.40 [−.10] 1.20 −5.78 [−.16] −1.08 [−.03]
ρ(Int.,β) −0.39 0.26 −0.85 .12
0.96
>.999
>.999
0.95
>.999
0.93
0.96
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0.50
0.46
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0.13
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Figure 1: Cognitive reflection predicting belief in God across
13 countries. Plot shows the posterior distribution for unstan-
dardized betas, as well as the posterior probability that CRT
performance predicts lower religious belief across sites. Es-
timate precision is largely driven by per-country sample size
(Table 2).
analytic thinkers were mildly more religious.3 Most of the
posterior densities’ masses are quite close to zero, suggest-
ing that any relationships between CRT performance and
religious disbelief within countries were modest, in even the
few cases where they were reliably evident.
Given the non-standardized and non-representative sam-
pling strategies employed across sites, and the predominance
of students in the samples, we are reluctant to over-interpret
potential causes for why the CRT-disbelief relationship is so
fickle across sites. However, our model estimates a .92 pos-
terior probability of an inverse relationship between slopes
and intercepts indicating that the analytic atheism relation-
ship was apparently strongest in sites more reliably religious
(Figure 2, Table 2).4 Speculating, it is possible that cogni-
3To test heterogeneity of the CRT effect across countries, we compared
two models fit with the lmer() function in the lme4 R package. One model
regressed belief in god on CRT score, with a random effect for country and
a random slope for CRTwithin country. The other was the same but without
the random slope. The different was significant at p<.006 by analysis of
variance.
4In a post-hoc regression across the 13 countries, with a measure of ana-
lytic atheism (the CRT effect) as the dependent variable and two predictors,
mean CRT score and mean belief in God, the effect of belief in God was
highly significant (p < .005), supporting the observation that the effect is
largest in the less secular countries. Mean CRT score had no effect.
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Figure 2: Posterior summaries for the average belief within
each country and the unstandardized beta within each coun-
try. Model predicts a stronger relationship between CRT and
religious disbelief in more religious countries. X-axis depicts
modeled random intercepts, y-axis depicts modeled random
slopes. Vertical lines reflect 95% HPDIs in betas and hori-
zontal lines reflect 95% HPDIs in intercepts.
tive reflection measures are tapping a tendency to question
prevailing cultural norms. In cultures where institutional
religion is waning and where acceptance of atheism arises
from tendencies to conform, it is possible that cognitive re-
flection may predict the rejection of atheism, a matter for
future investigation. Here, we infer only that the relationship
between cognitive reflection and disbelief is globally both
weak and fickle.
4 Discussion
Models for an inverse relationship between cognitive reflec-
tion and religious belief — here termed analytic atheism
— have sparked both scholarly and popular interest. How-
ever, the magnitude and cross-cultural generalizability of
this relationship has not to date been thoroughly and directly
investigated. Here, we report data from 13 diverse coun-
tries, and find quite mixed evidence. At the aggregate level,
our model predicts a .96 probability that cognitive reflection
is associated with religious disbelief. Though reliable, this
effect is small, as after adjusting for country-level dependen-
cies each additional correct CRT item predicts a reduction
in belief in God of less than 2 points on a scale of 0 to 100,
standardized β = −.05 [−.12, .02]. Within individual coun-
tries, cognitive reflection was, at best, a fickle predictor of
religious disbelief. Four relatively secular countries — New
Zealand, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and the UK
— did not even produce estimates that were reliably direc-
tionally consistent with the analytic atheist thesis. When a
relationship between cognitive reflection and religious dis-
belief was strongly apparent (in aggregate across sites, and
within Australia, Singapore, and the USA) or hinted at (in
the bulk of sampled countries), this relationship was quite
modest in magnitude, yielding standardized betas that hov-
ered at −0.10 or weaker. Thus, cognitive reflection may not
actually be an especially potent global predictor of atheism.
4.1 Future Questions and Constraints on
Generality
The present paper utilized the CRT as a sole measure of
cognitive reflection. The CRT is widely used, but may not
measure themost relevant sort of reflection very well (Baron,
Scott, Fincher, & Metz, 2015). Similar and convergent mea-
sures of analytic thinking and cognitive reflection also sim-
ilarly predict religious disbelief (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr,
Koehler & Fugelsang, 2014a; Saribay &Yilmaz, 2017), bol-
stering the claims to generalizability across measures and
also, possibly, providing more direct measures of the rel-
evant traits. Likewise, the single-item belief measure is
potentially problematic. There are may ways to “believe in
God”, some of which may be impervious to any sort of re-
flection. Cognitive reflection differentially predicts different
facets of religiosity (Bahçekapili &Yilmaz, 2017), as well as
religious affiliation (Pennycook et al., 2012) and other related
constructs (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler & Fugelsang,
2014b; Saribay & Yilmaz, 2017; Yilmaz & Saribay, 2016).
And other measures of reflection, as well as CRT items, pre-
dict specific religious beliefs such as endorsement of “divine
command theory” Piazza&Landy, 2013; Baron et al., 2015),
a view that explicitly discourages reflection on the ground
that the word of God is beyond human understanding.
The present paper can serve as a jumping board for addi-
tional cross-cultural exploration. The present results move
well past the WEIRD samples (Henrich et al., 2010) that
exemplify social psychology. Although we used a rela-
tively large cross-cultural sample, our findings would benefit
from extension to other contexts, such as small-scale, hunter-
gatherer communities, or older adults. In addition, our re-
sults present only suggestive evidence for the factors predict-
ing cross-cultural differences in analytic atheism. Given that
the strongest effects in the present study tended to emerge
from highly religious societies and that our sampling is, if
anything, skewed towards highly secular societies, we may
well observe more robust evidence of analytic atheism in
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other samples from highly religious societies. We would ex-
pect that strength of cultural support for religion and analytic
atheism interacts: without some sufficient level of cultural
support, there may be no need for people to analytically
override religious impulses and instruction. Furthermore, if
cognitive reflection (or some other measure) were tapping
a capacity to question prevailing cultural norms, it is pos-
sible that cognitive reflection may predict the rejection of
institutional atheism in some highly secular contexts.
4.2 Coda
Though Homo sapiens is a religious species, atheism exists
in all known societies, and is growing increasingly prevalent
across industrial societies — perhaps to an underappreci-
ated level due to underreporting (Gervais & Najle, 2018).
Researchers have theorized that analytic thinking and cog-
nitive reflection are engines of religious skepticism. Con-
sistent evidence for a positive association between cognitive
reflection and religious disbelief has been primarily found
in WEIRD samples. The present study provides a broader
cross-cultural evaluation of analytic atheism. We observe
that the analytic thinking model of religious disbelief (e.g.,
Bloom, 2007; Boyer, 2008) may overstate the magnitude
and cross-cultural generalizability of any relationship be-
tween cognitive reflection and atheism as usually measured.
In our view, these results outright falsify two claims central
to a strong version of analytic atheism: the effect is neither
consistent across cultures nor large enough to be a primary
driver of atheism in the simple way we and many others have
measured it. Indeed, according to the present results, if one
wants to predict a stranger’s degree of religious belief, they
may be better off knowing where the stranger is from rather
than how analytically the stranger thinks. Speculatively, it is
possible that cognitive reflection is related to a tendency to
challenge culturally dominant orthodoxies in general. How-
ever, whether this is so, and where the causal arrows flow,
are matters for future cultural psychological research. For
now, the present study contributes to psychological science
in challenging the ubiquity of the analytic atheism model,
while also contributing to growing awareness about the lim-
itations of inferring human universals fromWEIRD samples,
and demonstrating the power of cross-cultural approaches to
clarify how core beliefs arise from an interplay of individual
differences and local cultures.
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